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<ct>CONFLICTS AND COMPROMISES? EXPERIENCES OF DOING 
ANTHROPOLOGY AT THE INTERFACE OF PUBLIC POLICY 
 
<ca>Tim Allen and Melissa Parker 
 
<t1>Over the last 30 years, we have worked in a wide variety of contexts connected with 
aspects of health, international aid, humanitarian relief and criminal justice, mostly in 
Africa and the United Kingdom. We have never viewed ourselves as ‘applied 
anthropologists’,1 let alone ‘applied qualitative researchers’. We have tried to position 
ourselves as academic anthropologists who happen to work on certain kinds of issues that 
require collaboration with international and sometimes national institutions involved in 
aspects of public policy. Here we comment on issues that can arise in this kind of 
anthropological research, focusing in particular on dilemmas we have confronted 
ourselves.  
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<t>We have undertaken anthropological research in and on policy-related issues 
from the outset of our careers. Melissa Parker wrote a PhD and published a series of 
papers that challenged some of the underlying premises informing policy aimed at the 
control of a tropical disease (Parker 1992, 1993). Her research involved living in villages 
in the Gezira/Managil irrigation scheme, Sudan for several years. Proficient in Arabic, 
she investigated the social, behavioural and biological dimensions of infection with 
Schistosoma mansoni among women and children. Support was provided to her by staff 
from the disease control programme, as well and the Sudanese Ministry of Health, 
including assistance with the screening of large numbers of adults and children for 
parasitic infections. In addition, transport and medical supplies were provided by 
UNICEF, Oxfam, the Japanese government and the UK’s ODA (Overseas Development 
Assistance, now called the Department for International Development).  
<t>Tim Allen’s route into anthropology was through an aid agency. He had lived 
in Sudan for several years in the early 1980s, teaching English and History in schools and 
at Juba University, when Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) offered him support to live in 
Acholi and Madi villages for a year. He occasionally had to write reports and give talks 
about the effects of the NCA projects on the local population, and eventually published 
some of the findings (e.g. Allen 1987). Later, when carrying out PhD fieldwork in 
Uganda, he had a similar relationship with Médecins Sans Frontières, Lutheran World 
Federation and the office of the European Union. This provided him with transport and 
logistical support when needed, and allowed him to study programmes aimed at assisting 
refugees and returning refugees in northern Uganda from 1987 to 1991 (Allen 1988, 
1994, 1996; Allen and Morsink, 1994). 
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<t>In subsequent years both of us have worked with international agencies and 
other kinds of institutions involved in public policy. Parker, for example, carried out 
long-term research in the UK on sexual networks in London, linked to a clinic at a major 
teaching hospital, while Allen carried out research in Botswana, Uganda and Sudan with 
funding and support from international agencies including the UK’s Department for 
International Development (DfID), DANIDA (the official Danish development agency), 
World Vision, Save the Children, USAID (the official US aid agency), UNICEF (the UN 
agency for children), UNRISD (the UN Research Institute or Social Development) and 
UNDP (the UN Development Programme). Both of us have also been involved in public 
heath-related research in East Africa, with support from the WHO (World Health 
Organization), the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and various specialist institutions 
(such as the Kenyan Medical Research Institute and the Tanzanian National Institute for 
Medical Research).  
<t>Much of our fieldwork would have been impossible without funding and 
logistical support from organizations involved in public policy, even though we have 
occasionally been very critical of their activities. Contrary to views that have been voiced 
by some anthropologists about such collaborations, we have usually been able do our 
research without any overt attempts to control findings, or to restrict what we have 
included in publications. That is not to say that there have never been tensions, but when 
confrontations have arisen, we have managed to weather the storm. Over the years, we 
have found ways to deal with difficulties before they arise, while also appreciating that 
there are times when taking the flak can be a helpful role to play.  
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<h1>Concerns about anthropology and public policy 
<t1>Problems associated with the relationship between anthropology and public policy 
are well known. Historically, there was a great deal of soul-searching within the 
discipline about the ‘colonial encounter’. It was argued that the constraints placed on 
anthropologists, the kinds of questions they asked and the kinds of insights they offered 
were all too readily affected by the ways in which they reached the field. Evans-Pritchard 
even dedicated his great book on Azande witchcraft to Major Larken, the British district 
official who befriended him and assisted him (Evans-Pritchard 1937). His equally famous 
work on the Nuer was in large part a response to the Anglo-Egyptian administration’s 
need to know how to pacify them, following a series of violent incidents (Evans-Pritchard 
1940). However, if arguments about co-option apply to the past, they apply at least as 
strongly today. It was international aid agencies that enabled one of us (Allen) to spend 
time among the Azande in 2006 and among the Nuer in 2009.  
<t>In both cases it was far from straightforward to reach the locations concerned. 
After arriving in southern Sudan, it was necessary to take two flights on United Nation’s 
planes and then hire a county commissioner’s motor boat, at considerable expense, to 
reach the Nuer population around Fangak. Three years earlier, reaching Zandeland so 
soon after the signing of a peace agreement in Sudan had proved even more difficult. 
There had been local clashes between Zande and Dinka soldiers in the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army, and a rebel force from Uganda, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), 
was based along the nearby border with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In 
order to access the region, Allen agreed to carry out research and write a report on 
HIV/AIDS for World Vision, a Christian-linked international non-governmental 
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organization (NGO). It is an agency that Allen had taken issue with on a number of 
occasions, notably over exaggerated estimates of HIV/AIDS rates in northern Uganda as 
a consequence of LRA activities (Allen 2006a). However, World Vision, unlike many 
other international NGOs, often works far away from the bigger towns, and sometimes 
where there is little or no other international presence. It was the only agency working in 
the places Allen wanted to visit. Equally important, Word Vision was Allen’s insurance. 
The agency would have done everything possible to evacuate him, along with its own 
staff, if the need had arisen. To arrive at the border area required security clearance from 
the newly established government of southern Sudan and, starting in Kenya, the journey 
involved four flights on small planes spread out over several days, followed by an eight-
hour car journey. Fieldwork was then facilitated with the use of a motorbike. All of this, 
as well as accommodation and food, was provided by World Vision. 
<t>In these circumstances, supporting agencies can be understandably sensitive 
about being criticized in published articles and books. Very often, there are pressures 
placed on the anthropologist to avoid such confrontations, while she or he may also feel 
appreciative of the care provided by well-meaning aid workers in the field, and feel 
considerable loyalty towards them. In short, there are problems in ‘biting the hand that 
feeds you’ too hard and judging how much rigorous analysis is appropriate is not always 
straightforward.  
<t>Commenting on discussions at the 1983 Association of Social Anthropologists 
(ASA) Conference, part of which focused on social anthropology and development 
policy, Michael Redclift observed that attitudes among anthropologists had changed since 
the ASA Conference in 1973. In the early 1970s, he observed, the prevailing attitude 
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seemed to be, ‘we will only join the development fraternity on our own terms’. Ten years 
later, he felt that view has been set aside: ‘Today, the employment crisis among 
anthropologists … has triggered a different response. The call seems to be to join the 
development brigade at almost any cost.’ In his view, there were real dangers that this 
would damage the discipline, as research questions and the weighting of evidence were 
framed by people with agendas that had little to do with anthropological understandings. 
‘Must the anthropologist compromise’, he asked, ‘only to be compromised?’ (Redclift 
1985: 202). 
<t>At the time, many academic anthropologists took the view that the answer was 
‘Yes’. Indeed, both of us have experienced some scepticism over the years from 
colleagues that it is possible to do credible anthropological research with funding or 
support from parties with potentially ulterior interests in ascertaining the ‘right’ kind of 
results. Allen, for example, was taken aside by a senior anthropologist at Oxford while 
writing his PhD in the 1980s and told that now he was doing academic anthropology, he 
should stop working with aid agencies. The strong implication was that it brought social 
anthropology into disrepute. Similar views were still being expressed by some of his 
colleagues at the London School of Economics (LSE) several years later. 
<t>The expansion of work for anthropologists in policy arenas, particularly in the 
health sector and international development, and the fact that many anthropology 
graduates seek work in these areas after they leave university, has not meant that the kind 
of worries Redclift expressed have abated. On the contrary, they have been elaborated 
and discussed in more detail. Academic anthropologists like Escobar (1995) and 
Ferguson (1990), for example, have provided popular critiques of the whole international 
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development enterprise; and some of those who have worked on policy issues have built 
careers by explaining the ways in which constraints are imposed and how that makes 
serious anthropological study largely untenable. One of the best known anthropologists to 
have espoused the latter perspective is David Mosse. He worked closely with aid 
organizations for more than a dozen years, but came to the conclusion that putatively 
scholarly work is almost inevitably co-opted when it is linked to consultancy, or faces a 
conflict of interest.  
<t>Mosse (2004) wrote a book about his work as a social development consultant 
on a project in India that had been funded by DfID, and found himself in trouble: 
<EXT2> 
… there was consternation from my consultant colleagues and managers, who felt 
that I had departed from the received view of the project as an overwhelming 
success. The point was not that my book… rejected the view of success as being 
the outcome of good policy and technical design. Instead, it drew attention to the 
contradictions and compromises of practice … (Mosse 2006)  
</EXT2> 
<t1>In early 2004, objections were made to Mosse’s publisher, to his university research 
ethics committee, to the academic head of the university, as well as to the Association of 
Social Anthropologists, ‘on the grounds that the book was unfair, biased, contained 
statements that were defamatory, and would seriously damage the professional reputation 
of individuals and institutions.’ In the event, his university, the ASA and the publisher 
were either not persuaded or decided that they were not in a position to adjudicate on the 
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matter. As a result, Mosse was not obliged to make any changes to his text. The case has 
become well known, at least in British anthropology, largely because of the interesting 
way Mosse has written about it. To many, it confirms the impossibility of doing proper 
social anthropology with international development agencies – a perspective Mosse 
himself has come to largely share. 
<t>We are not so pessimistic. It is certainly the case that all kinds of pressures are 
brought to bear on anthropologists working with international agencies to interpret things 
in certain ways, and to avoid commenting on certain issues. Indeed, we have confronted 
the kinds of direct pressure placed on Mosse. In our experience they are not so unusual. 
But are these pressures actually any worse than constraints anthropologists experience 
when they work with local or national institutions, or when they discover sensitive things 
about the people they live with? Anthropologists are always confronting the dilemma of 
how much to reveal, and what kinds of information might be harmful to informants. It is 
a problem arising from the intimacies that are an inherent part of our methodology. 
Anthropologists find out uncomfortable truths, including things that might be considered 
confidential or even secret. To invert a Swahili proverb: not all secrets are for sharing. 
<t>It is also important to note that while some DfID employees may have felt 
betrayed by Mosse’s book, senior staff we have spoken to had not heard about the case 
until we discussed it with them. Their view was that to oppose publication in the manner 
attempted could only have been counterproductive. They asked questions about who had 
actually raised objections within DfID, because it had never come up for internal 
discussion as far as they were aware. It is possible that they were not telling the truth, but 
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they did seem genuinely surprised by our account of what happened. In our experience, 
the view inside DfID is that critical research on development issues, some of which is 
directly funded by DfID on a ‘hands off’ basis in university departments, raises the bar on 
the quality of UK aid. Perhaps that point is debatable, but what is interesting is that 
institutionally the idea of trying to muzzle critical analysis is viewed as inappropriate. It 
should also be mentioned that many staff within DfID have themselves taken degrees in 
social anthropology, including the current director general for policy and global issues. 
<t>Overall, we have found, as Mosse himself did in the end, that when overt 
pressures are applied, it is possible to deal with them. In addition, we have discovered 
that writing as honestly as possible about what we have observed, and backing up critical 
comments with robust evidence, is respected, even if it is not liked. Years ago the 
anthropologist Barbara Harrell-Bond told Allen to accept support from anyone if they 
allow you to do research, but never agree not to publish what you find out. It was good 
advice. There are, as Mosse notes, clauses in contracts about funding institutions having 
intellectual property rights. But they are vague, and very difficult to implement. In most 
instances we have found it is possible to strike out those sections, or to make an 
arrangement whereby material is leased to the donors, but copyright is retained by us. 
There have been the occasional unpleasant moments, but whenever efforts have been 
made to use a contract or any other measure to restrict what we write, we have always 
been able to resist if we have decided it is the right thing to do. We have never been 
forced to remain silent, even if we have sometimes decided to bide our time before 
releasing our findings. In the following sections we provide a few specific examples of 
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the kind of work we have been doing, mainly related to health issues, and comment on 
how conflicts and compromises have been worked out.  
 
<h1>Divergent approaches to evidence  
<t1>One of the most important issues confronting anthropologists working at the 
interface of public policy relates to divergent disciplinary understandings of evidence, 
both in terms of what constitutes reliable information and the way in which dissemination 
occurs. Many policy-orientated research projects tend to emphasize ‘scientific’ methods, 
foregrounding quantitative approaches that appear to replicate natural science research. 
This is a reason why economics is often viewed as the most important social science 
discipline. It also means that studies published by the World Bank, for example, will 
often refer to econometric papers, or will have an appendix describing regressions used in 
the analysis. Often policy professionals themselves do not fully comprehend the methods 
used in these contributions, but they are perceived as lending credibility to the results and 
conclusions. More generally, there is a prevalent view among policy makers that 
evidence means data, and that data means numbers.  
<t>In this context, social anthropologists can find themselves at a disadvantage. 
Their findings generally lack a quantitative dimension, and can be set aside as interesting 
but anecdotal. For this reason, it is important for those working on public policy to equip 
themselves with a basic understanding of quantitative techniques, so that it is possible to 
discern the strengths and weaknesses of what they are reading. Often such a familiarity 
with quantitative methods, and avoidance of defensive dismissals of numerical data, 
opens up useful alliances. There are many academic economists, demographers, 
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epidemiologists and clinical scientists who are just as appalled as anthropologists by the 
quality of analysis that appears in policy documents. It is helpful to be able to talk to 
them in a language they can comprehend. 
<t>In the health sector, anthropologists work alongside colleagues from a variety 
of disciplinary backgrounds in both the biological and social sciences; and they often find 
themselves cast as ‘the handmaiden of biomedicine’. In these circumstances, research 
protocols may preclude open-ended investigations. Underlying concepts and categories 
informing beliefs and behaviour may be taken for granted, and the notion that they should 
be identified and scrutinized strongly discouraged. The investigation of health and 
sickness is typically divorced from the study of political economy and history, let alone 
local conceptions of suffering and therapy. Reductive styles of reasoning render wide-
ranging, non-quantifiable explorations interesting, but ‘anecdotal’. Anthropologists who 
do more than address predefined questions such as ‘What are the social and cultural 
factors that impede the willingness or ability of patients to comply with particular drug 
regimes?’ or ‘What are the social and cultural barriers that need to be overcome to ensure 
the smooth running of a vaccination campaign?’ are likely to be viewed by at least some 
of those they work with as difficult, foolish or possibly threatening. They may well find 
their insights dismissed as ‘not proper science’.  
<t>As a result, many so-called ‘applied medical anthropologists’ end up doing 
‘knowledge, attitudes and practice surveys’, ‘focused ethnographic research’, ‘process 
monitoring’ or ‘participatory appraisal’. This is usually undertaken in a relatively short 
time span, sometimes over a few weeks or even days. Such techniques can produce useful 
findings, when done with skill. But most epidemiologists, clinicians and public health 
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practitioners have no formal training in anthropology and, not uncommonly, equate this 
way of working with what anthropologists should do. It can be hard to suggest otherwise. 
The problem is compounded by the fact that some ‘applied medical anthropologists’ are 
comfortable with a range of qualitative methods other than participant observation, and 
basically accept the premises and approaches of biomedicine as a starting point for their 
work (see, for example, Pelto and Pelto, 2008 [1978]). Eager to work with 
epidemiologists and clinical professionals, they rarely challenge biomedical 
understandings of evidence, whereby data are treated as objective ‘facts’ that have 
analytical power when they form a significantly distinctive pattern. Compliance with 
biomedical approaches to evidence has led, on occasion, to tense verbal exchanges 
between such ‘applied medical anthropologists’ and other anthropologists, who maintain 
that a distance from biomedical paradigms and research grounded in comparative 
ethnography are crucial components of the discipline.  
<t>All of this is not to suggest that anthropologists who carry out conventional 
participant observation fieldwork and who treat biomedical policy and practice as an 
aspect of their fieldwork are not able to make useful practical contributions to 
contemporary public health issues (see, for example, Davison et al. 1991; Fairhead and 
Leach 2006, 2007;   Harper 2006; MacGregor 2006; Shaw 2009 Whyte et al. 2004). It is 
important to emphasize, however, that a key aspect of the influence that critically 
engaged anthropologists can have on public policy is that the status of evidence is not 
simply set aside. To be recognized as important rather than ‘interesting’, anthropologists 
have to take into account, and engage with, the ways in which evidence is generally 
constructed by biomedically orientated researchers and practitioners. It can lead to some 
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challenging encounters! The tensions may be illustrated with reference to our own 
research on schistosomiasis in East Africa (Parker et al. 2008; Parker and Allen 2011; 
Allen and Parker 2011). 
<t>Work carried out by epidemiologists and parasitologists, as well as some 
applied qualitative researchers, suggested that treatment programmes were going well. 
Kabatereine et al. (2007), for example, followed a cohort of children over a period of two 
years in north-western Uganda. These children were treated every year with two drugs, 
praziquantel and albendazole, as part of a national programme to control schistosomiasis 
(bilharziasis) and soil-transmitted helminthiases (parasitic intestinal worms). The selected 
children were monitored before treatment and at six-monthly intervals after each annual 
round of treatment. Key biomedical indicators included noting whether the children were 
positive or negative for these parasitic infections and, if they were infected, their intensity 
of infection and the presence or absence of clinical signs of infection such as 
hepatomegaly and splenomegaly. Additional epidemiological research was undertaken by 
Brooker et al (2005). This was a cross-sectional study monitoring changing patterns of 
infection among school children in Uganda over time. Both studies suggested that 
endeavours to control neglected tropical diseases by distributing drugs to school children, 
free of charge, were having a positive impact as there was a marked reduction in 
prevalence and clinical indicators of morbidity. In addition to this biomedically orientated 
research, Fleming et al (2009) undertook process monitoring to explore adult responses to 
the mass distribution of drugs at selected sites in north-western and south-eastern 
Uganda. This paper also presented a positive assessment of the National Control 
Programme for the control of schistosomiasis and soil-transmitted helminthiases, albeit 
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from a different perspective; and argued that there was growing demand for treatment 
among adults and children. 
<t>By contrast, ethnographic research undertaken by Parker et al. (2008) on local 
responses to the national integrated control programme in north-western Uganda 
suggested that the picture was much more complicated than that conveyed by the above 
studies. It highlighted the point that it is hazardous to assume that targeted populations 
will necessarily understand or agree with the rationale for the free distribution of drugs to 
adults and children, and demonstrated that treatment was being actively resisted in some 
places. While there was no doubt that large numbers of children were swallowing tablets 
under the authoritative gaze of their teachers, there was every indication to suggest that 
adults did not feel similarly compelled to take the medicine and, in some cases, forbade 
their children to take it too.  
<t>Further research undertaken in north-western and south-eastern Uganda 
(Parker and Allen, 2011) highlighted mistaken assumptions guiding the delivery of drugs, 
and raised the question of how much weight should be given to different kinds of 
evidence. Kabatereine et al.’s research (2007), for example, assessed the impact of 
treatment on a cohort of primary school children. Our own local-level research suggested, 
however, that it was misleading to extrapolate findings from this study to make general 
observations about the effectiveness of the national control programme for several 
reasons. First, the number of children successfully completing primary school in under-
resourced, rural areas is small, so the number of school-aged children receiving multiple 
rounds of treatment is likely to be small too. Second, cohort studies are necessarily biased 
towards children from families of long-term, stable residency and relative wealth. In 
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north-western Uganda, however, mobility is a feature of daily life – a point underlined by 
the large numbers of children that dropped out of the study over time. Third, local 
research revealed that hundreds of Congolese and Sudanese people regularly move across 
borders to this part of Uganda. As yet, there are no national control programmes for the 
treatment of tropical diseases in these neighbouring countries and our own parasitological 
investigations revealed that more than 95% of migrants in the study area were positive for 
S.mansoni and/or soil-transmitted helminthiases. Almost certainly, these patterns of 
migration contributed to the high rates of reinfection (ranging from 54% to 84%) 
recorded among school children at selected schools in the district. 
<t>Not surprisingly, reactions to our findings have been very mixed. The 
development of the Ugandan national programme for the Control of Schistosomiasis and 
Soil-Transmitted Helminthiases would not have happened without the financial support 
of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, contributions from drug companies and 
donations of aid from the United States and other countries. This means that most of 
those involved in the treatment programme, from the head of vector control in the 
Ministry of Health to the medical researchers and drug distributors, operate with soft 
funding. This creates a difficult situation: How can the head of a programme, receiving 
millions of pounds from a philanthropic organization to undertake a piece of work, 
publicly say, ‘This programme has run into difficulties’? Why would an international 
agency or philanthropic organization renew a programme if it is not working properly? 
There are enormous pressures to ‘prove’ that money is being spent wisely. For all the 
critical comments and private reflections, it is not even possible for a Minister of Health 
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or a programme manager to say that ‘I do not know if the programme is working well or 
not, because the available information is too partial’.  
<t>With respect to our research on neglected tropical diseases in Uganda, it has 
led to an array of responses. These include contacting informants in the field to tell them 
it is their duty as citizens of their country to say positive things about free treatment; 
requests by personnel implementing the programme for us to present our information 
selectively; and heated exchanges conveying a sense that we are disloyal and risk 
undermining the future of free treatment for debilitating diseases. However, there have 
been other occasions when we have discussed the strengths and weaknesses of our 
findings with biomedical practitioners and researchers with the common purpose of 
improving treatment and monitoring. This has not, as yet, led to material changes in the 
running of the national control programme, but the desire is clearly now there to respond 
to the difficulties identified. Our findings are in the process of being published and 
disseminated, not least by staff from the World Health Organization, where some tropical 
disease specialists have become as concerned as us about current trends in mass drug 
administration. 
<t>This also applies to our research on tropical diseases elsewhere in East Africa, 
which if anything proved even more controversial. A layer of complexity was added by 
the fact that we had a PhD student doing fieldwork on tropical diseases in Tanzania at the 
time that one of our reports landed on the desk of a key funding institution. The report 
highlighted fundamental problems, including widespread over-reporting of drug take up. 
The director of the programme told us that he found the executive summary so depressing 
he could not bring himself to read the rest of the document. He did not suggest that 
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anything we had written was inaccurate, but he was reluctant to circulate the report, and 
keen that it was not shared with the Tanzanian Ministry of Health. He was concerned that 
senior figures might react by deciding to work with alternative agencies in the future. 
With an array of implementing agencies to choose from, it was not an unreasonable 
concern. We were also asked not to publish our findings, because there were concerns 
that the information would jeopardize future provision of free medicines by drug 
companies. 
<t>Taking these factors into account, as well as the vulnerability of our PhD 
student if we rocked the boat too much, we decided to delay publication. Almost two 
years later, and having gathered more information (including details about riots that took 
place during some drug distributions), we provided advance notice that we would now 
publish. The idea was not greeted with enthusiasm, but we responded by saying that 
considerable time had passed and discussions to alter the structure of the national 
programme concerned were already at an advanced stage. We have thought carefully 
about our audience and have chosen to avoid conventional medical journals, because the 
reviewing process tends to mute critical voices and discourage the publication of articles 
with negative results (Allen and Parker 2011; Parker and Allen 2011).  
<t>While some policy makers and biomedical researchers welcome our 
contribution, others do not. On the one hand, the World Health Organization recently 
highlighted our findings by placing a direct link to one of our articles on their Tropical 
Disease Research website (http://apps.who.int/tdr/svc/news-events/news/social-science-
ntd.). On the other hand, a researcher based at a medical school involved in monitoring 
one of the treatment programmes responded to the same publication in negative terms. To 
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quote from a circulated email: ‘People who have read this [paper] say “Are they for you 
or against you?” On balance I have to say it reads like against. Which considering all the 
support you have received is … disappointing….’. It is possible that opportunities for us 
to do further fieldwork on neglected tropical diseases will be restricted, but we are 
optimistic that things will not work out like that.  
 
<h1>Ownership and dissemination of findings 
<t1>Tensions over research findings can sometimes generate more overt confrontation, 
especially when it comes to the ‘ownership’ of data. Anthropologists are far from unique 
in having to confront these difficulties. Well-known economists, including Joseph Stiglitz 
and William Easterly, have been compelled to leave the World Bank, in part because they 
used World Bank data to raise critical points about the institution’s policies in their 
publications. Thus, the following example may be extreme, but it is far from exceptional. 
<t>Parker undertook several years’ fieldwork on sexual networks in the United 
Kingdom. This fieldwork was part of a multi-disciplinary research project involving 
collaboration with epidemiologists, mathematical modellers and clinicians. Based at an 
NHS-funded clinic for sexually transmitted infections, the research tried to map out 
sexual networks in a multi-cultural urban setting by tracking gonorrhoea as it spread from 
one person to another. Within six months, it became apparent that it was going to be little 
short of impossible for Parker or any member of staff from the clinic to move much 
beyond the collection of a series of individual accounts of recent sexual contacts (which 
are usually referred to as egocentric networks by mathematicians, epidemiologists and 
sociologists). The reason was simple: almost no-one attending the clinic for the treatment 
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of gonorrhoea was willing to impart sufficient information to enable their sexual contacts 
to be contacted through the existing system of partner notification, and few patients could 
be persuaded to bring their contacts into the clinic to be screened. At this juncture, 
relations between staff on the project became fraught. It was hard to see how an interim 
report, let alone a final report, to the funding agency could say anything of much interest 
about sexual networks. On what basis could the salaries of the research team be justified 
when the project was generating minimal data of academic or practical interest? 
<t>Meetings followed meetings and various suggestions were made about how to 
amend the study design. These included visiting known public ‘cruising’ sites late at 
night, and asking those soliciting or offering sex if a member of the research team could 
return to their homes to chat about their sexual contacts. Parker, unconvinced that such 
suggestions would work any better than the previous ones, suggested that it might be 
easier to map out sexual networks through the study of HIV/AIDS rather than the study 
of gonorrhoea. Preliminary research suggested that those who were HIV positive were 
more talkative and trusting of staff associated with the clinic than those free from this 
infection, but infected with other sexually transmitted infections. However, there was no 
support for developing the study in this way. Concerned that the other proposed 
amendments to the study design would yield nothing, Parker decided to pursue the work 
on sexual networks and HIV transmission independently.  
<t>It was not until the end of her contract that staff working on the project 
realized how little useful data on sexual networks and gonorrhoea had been collected by 
anyone on the team. At this point, the head of the clinic called a meeting. Aware that the 
funding agency would require a detailed report demonstrating that money had been well 
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spent, he insisted that the clinic should take possession of all the data that Parker had 
collected on sexual networks and HIV transmission. She was told to bring all the data she 
had gathered to the clinic and hand it over. The data would then be available for others to 
analyse. For Parker this was unacceptable. She had trekked around London for the best 
part of two years, often late at night and during weekends, following leads that would 
enable her to map out sexual networks. No-one else at the clinic had been involved in the 
fieldwork, or had any idea who was connected to whom. Indeed, clinic staff had gone out 
of their way to ensure that no research on HIV networks had taken place in the clinic 
unless it was directly linked to the gonorrhoea network study. Quite apart from what she 
perceived to be an injustice towards herself, she thought that it would have been a 
travesty to leave others with the task of interpreting her material, and a betrayal of the 
relationships she had built up with her informants. 
<t>When Parker refused to comply, she was told that legal action would be taken 
against her and that senior staff at the hospital would do everything possible to ensure 
that she never obtained another academic job. Shocked and a bit frightened, she 
considered capitulating. However, she took advice from other anthropologists, including 
a senior anthropologist at London University, who took the view that threats of this kind 
were immoral – exploiting the position of an anthropologist whose contract had just 
ended. Parker was immediately offered an honorary research fellowship and institutional 
support. She was also advised to contact the human resources division of the teaching 
hospital concerned, and to her relief was told that the incidents in the clinic amounted to 
institutional bullying. There were doubtless then some frank internal exchanges, and the 
case was dropped. Parker proceeded to publish her fieldwork (Parker 1999, 2001, 2006). 
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<t>In common with Mosse’s research involving DfID in India, the above is an 
example of how confrontational events can become. They can sometimes prove 
insurmountable. There have been cases, for example, where PhD students have 
effectively had their data taken away from them or been forced to terminate their 
research. However, in most cases we know of, the more extreme the efforts to control or 
muzzle research, the easier it has been to resist them, even if it has not felt like that at the 
time. It is not unusual for those exerting their authority to overplay their hand. They 
assume that the researcher will be easily intimidated. Standing firm and seeking 
professional support often does the trick.  
<t>If it does not, there is another method that can be used too. It is possible to 
‘leak’ the results. This has become very effective with the expansion of the Internet and it 
has made arguments about controlling information somewhat redundant. Even if a 
contract has been signed stating that a funding agency ‘owns’ the research findings, there 
is very little that international or national institutions can do about it. There are problems 
with the ways in which information is accessed and uncritically deployed from Internet 
sources, but the Internet certainly empowers researchers if they choose to use it. The 
following example illustrates this point. 
<t>In 2005, Allen was funded and supported by the UK section of an 
international NGO to carry out research in the war zone of northern Uganda. Funding and 
logistical support from the agency enabled him to spend time in internal displacement 
camps, some of which were not easy to reach from the main towns due to land-mines, 
attacks by the LRA and curfews imposed by the Ugandan army. The focus of the work 
was on the implications of the intervention by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for 
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children, both those in the camps and those who had been abducted by the LRA. The 
fieldwork was quite difficult, and on occasion very disturbing. It included spending 
nights in places where terrible atrocities had been perpetrated, and where fighting was 
ongoing. Amongst other things, the research revealed that the emphasis on traditional 
forms of healing as a means of dealing with the LRA was overstated, as were assertions 
that the mass of the local population were vehemently opposed to international criminal 
justice mechanisms. Another issue highlighted was that many of those who had been 
abducted by the LRA were adults, rather than children. Indeed the majority of those taken 
were probably over the age of 18, and very many of those being supported by aid 
agencies after escaping or being captured were adults too, even if they were being 
assisted in reception centres that were funded to deal with returned children. 
<t>The findings proved challenging to the NGO, because they countered 
perspectives that had been taken as given. Presentations were made in northern Uganda 
and Kampala, and the NGO also organized a meeting in Oslo to discuss the draft report at 
which all the European sections of its network were present. Following this, a meeting 
was organized in The Hague with the ICC to discuss the situation and present in detail the 
NGO’s concerns about possible threats to children. One particularly significant aspect of 
that meeting was that it was possible to demonstrate to the ICC that the protection then 
being offered to those interviewed by the prosecutor’s team was inadequate. Several 
individuals who had spoken to ICC investigators had been easily located and interviewed 
by Allen and NGO staff. Their anonymity could not be guaranteed. 
<t>A few weeks later, the final report was finished, and a launch was planned in 
Kampala. However, a couple of days before flying to Uganda, Allen was informed that 
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the NGO had decided not to have a launch after all, but to keep the report for internal 
consumption. This came as a shock; several NGO staff had been very positive about the 
study and were keen to shift away from the approach that had been in place for several 
years. However, it seems that not all the members of the agency’s network were pleased 
with the findings. Although the specific reasons why it had been decided to keep the 
report secret were never outlined in any detail, discussions with sympathetic NGO staff 
suggested that there were concerns about making public the facts that so many adults had 
been abducted, and that there was less enthusiasm for so-called traditional reconciliation 
practices than had been supposed. Funding had been raised on the perception that the war 
was being waged by traumatized and innocent children, and some sections of the NGO 
had helped promote the view that reintegration of those who had spent time with the 
LRA, including perpetrators of very violent acts, should be based on local notions of 
forgiveness. To suggest that so many adults had been abducted by the LRA, and also that 
the ICC might have a positive role to play in dealing with the situation, was therefore 
viewed as a potential threat. 
<t>Not surprisingly, Allen was unwilling to accept the shelving of the report. The 
contract that had been signed was vague about ownership of data, and nothing had been 
agreed about what would happen to the final report. This was pointed out to the NGO, as 
was the fact that a draft of the report had already been circulated to the ICC and other 
interested parties in email attachments. It was, in effect, already in the public arena. In the 
face of these points, the NGO accepted that the final report could be circulated, but 
wanted reference to the NGO having commissioned and supported the work removed. 
Subsequently, the report was expanded into a book (Allen 2006b) and, by the time it was 
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published, issues had moved on in Uganda. What had appeared to be so controversial in 
2005 was more widely accepted. The NGO then complained to Allen that the agency had 
not been explicitly mentioned in the Acknowledgements! They will have to wait for the 
second edition. 
<t>From Allen’s point of view, there was an important lesson to learn here. It is 
usually a good idea to circulate drafts of a report as widely as possible by email, and to 
post a near-final version on the Internet as quickly as possible. Once a piece of work is 
available, there is little point in trying to hide it. The horse has already left the stable. The 
response is normally for the agency concerned to post an official version almost 
immediately. More recent examples of this approach are studies Allen has been involved 
with in northern Uganda, funded by UNICEF and USAID, and in southern Sudan, funded 
by DfID and PACT Sudan (Allen and Schomerus 2005; Schomerus and Allen 2010). In 
both these cases, as with that of the ICC report for the international NGO, findings 
contradicted received wisdoms. But, while some staff within the relevant agencies were 
concerned or even hostile to points made, many others were very keen to have points 
placed in the public arena that they would find hard to make themselves. 
<t>In some ways it is harder to deal with the more subtle disagreements about the 
use of evidence. Aid agencies, government departments and medical institutions have 
nominally pervasive and strict ethical procedures for research. These are partly meant to 
protect those who might be exploited or harmed, such as patients, children, the elderly 
and those divulging sensitive information. However, as has often been noted, ethical 
clearance and ethical arguments are also used to protect the funding institutions and its 
personnel. In practice this can mean that there is a kind of censorship of certain 
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arguments or findings, especially where they challenge or contradict established 
protocols. Sometimes it is not clear when ethical guidelines are really about ethics, and 
when they are about maintaining the kinds of consensus that anthropological research 
frequently subverts.  
<t>To give one example, when Allen submitted his report on HIV/AIDS among 
the Azande to World Vision and the Southern Sudan Ministry of Health in 2006, there 
were many points in it contradicting assumptions, including the view that disease 
prevalence was very high in the study area. This provoked quite a bit of debate, but Allen 
was asked to make only one significant change before the report was published. He was 
asked to remove detailed reference to an HIV-positive man who sat in the market place 
and discussed his disease with anyone who would listen. This placed Allen in an 
awkward ethical position. On the one hand, the case for preserving anonymity was being 
made on ethical grounds, but the man in question had spent hours discussing his 
condition with the researchers, and had insisted on photographs being taken of his body 
so that these could be shown to a wide audience. He was also very keen that his name be 
recorded too, as a kind of testimonial and in the hope that funds would become available 
to set up a segregated community for HIV-positive people. In the end, Allen agreed to the 
name of the individual being removed from the report, as well as his photographs. Where 
the photograph was meant to appear, a caption explains why it was not included. Thus, an 
attempt was made to keep the thrust of the analysis and to do justice to the information 
collected, while respecting the concerns of the funders. Later, when the academic paper 
was ready for publication, a further discussion of the issue occurred with the journal’s 
editor. His view was that it was unethical not to include the details that the HIV-positive 
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man wanted to have recorded. So his photographs were included, although Allen decided 
not to have them reproduced as clearly as they might have been, and not to include the 
individual’s name next to them, although at that point he could have done so. Perhaps it 
was still a compromise, but it was entirely Allen’s decision (Allen 2007). 
<t>More generally, there are times when the concerns that those implementing 
policies have about releasing information do not fall under clear ethical guidelines, but 
nevertheless may seem ethically reasonable. This is particularly the case when releasing 
findings might have implications for someone in particular, even if that person is not 
really someone who might normally be considered vulnerable. This was an issue with 
Mosse’s work on DfID. Was it ethical for him to reveal so much about off-the-record and 
informal discussions relating to easily identifiable individuals? Many anthropologists go 
out of their way to disguise the identities of those they write about, often making up the 
names of people and places. Should this equally apply to work at the interface of public 
policy? Again it can be hard to decide where ethical or moral considerations should 
apply. Were those DfID staff who were angry about Mosse’s book right to complain 
about him acting unethically? Above we have mentioned a ‘teaching hospital’ and an 
‘international NGO’. Would it be better − and also ethical − to be less coy and more 
explicit?  
<t>There are no straightforward answers. Decisions have to be made in each case 
based on consideration of what is appropriate, but it is important to recognize that what 
may seem the correct approach to anthropologists may seem unacceptable to others. 
Indeed, anthropologists working in multi-disciplinary and policy settings are very likely 
to find some people who will find things that anthropologists take for granted very 
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troubling, including the way in which anthropologists publish single-authored books and 
articles. They will on occasion, find themselves being asked how it can be ‘ethical’ not to 
recognize the contributions of those that have supervised or facilitated their research, and 
the local collaborators and assistants who have helped them in the field. In biomedical 
research, for example, it is the norm to do so, and an aspect of the way that the credibility 
of a publication is assessed. 
 
<h1>Conclusion 
<t1>It will be clear from the examples we have given that the two of us are now in a 
relatively privileged position. We both have permanent positions in academic 
departments. We do not have to raise our own salaries from soft funding, and we are not 
responsible for sustaining the income of many research-funded colleagues. Nowadays, if 
we were to confront serious problems, in the way that David Mosse did, we would expect 
our universities to back us up, just as his did. If we decide that we do not like working 
with a particular funder, or if contract arrangements are too demanding, we can simply 
say no. Our careers do not depend on ‘fitting in’ all the time. Others are not so fortunate, 
and in the early stages of our careers, neither were we. 
<t>Those most vulnerable to being compromised by researching on issues 
concerned with public policy are those whose livelihoods depend on keeping their donors 
content. That is not just the case for anthropologists. It also applies, for example, to 
medical researchers of all kinds. From our own experiences, epidemiologists and 
parasitologists whose research is expensive and largely soft-funded encounter 
considerable pressures to produce positive results. Amongst anthropologists, those most 
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vulnerable are likely to have to raise their own salaries from grants and consultancies and 
are not based in academic departments. We know of several situations in which such 
researchers have felt that they have had to keep silent, or have been forced to abandon 
their research when it reveals ongoing problems too starkly. So we are certainly not 
saying that anthropologists are immune from being compromised. Work at the interface 
of public policy will always involve dealing with attempts to sustain consensus views. 
But are anthropologists more open to manipulation than scholars working within other 
disciplines? We have not found that to be the case. We end with four key ways to avoid 
it. 
<t>First, for anthropologists working on policy issues it is really important to 
ensure that insights are explicitly supported by robust evidence, especially when those 
insights are threatening to entrenched interests. This will often mean triangulating 
findings with other available evidence and, wherever possible, numerating results. How 
many people have been spoken to? What percentage acted in a certain way? These are 
not questions that anthropologists always ask, but if you do not want your analysis called 
‘anecdotal’, then you need to demonstrate that insights are representative. If your findings 
are strong enough, in the end that will be recognized, even by those who initially seem 
antagonistic. 
<t>Second, try to make sure you have backup for when things become difficult. If 
you are not in a university department, check the wording of contracts and negotiate the 
removal of things that are overtly controlling, or perhaps just don’t sign until the work is 
finished. In our experience it is surprisingly common for contracts only to be agreed after 
research is underway or has already been completed. Often it is not necessary to have a 
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signed contract to be insured during fieldwork, or to receive funds. Look into these 
things, and take advice. Link yourself with an academic department if at all possible as a 
visiting researcher or fellow, and find out what support might be available. If you end up 
being bullied, as happened to Parker when she was attached to a teaching hospital, do 
what she did. Contact professional bodies and senior academic anthropologists. Do not 
just roll over. Almost certainly, you are in a stronger position than you think you are.  
Third, do not let rules about dissemination, including restrictive ethical protocols, 
lead to a situation in which you are effectively pressurized to act unethically. You will 
generally be a good position to know what is the most appropriate course of action, or 
sometimes the least bad one, for those who have allowed you into their lives. That is a 
responsibility, and it cannot just be set aside because of rules generated primarily to 
protect funding bodies or avoid controversy.  
<t>Fourth, if you want to be a critically rigorous and independent anthropologist 
who works on public policy issues, then you must always seek to make your findings 
public. If you do not, you are likely to end up as a qualitative researcher investigating a 
range of pre-set questions according to some sort of established formula – such as a 
‘Knowledge, Attitudes and Practice’ survey. Ideally, publication means peer-reviewed 
journals and books, but sometimes it means using other mechanisms, such as news media 
or the Internet. Occasionally, there will be things that must be kept confidential, but if 
you do not place most of what you discover in the public arena, then you are inevitably 
more vulnerable to being compromised. There are many researchers who for a variety of 
reasons take the latter route. While you may find some such individuals encouraging of 
what you do, because you can make points that they feel they cannot, you are likely to 
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make others very uncomfortable. You may well find them the most hostile of all to what 
you are doing, precisely because you remind them of the choice they have made. 
 
<h1>Note 
<NOTE>1 The term ‘applied anthropology’ is commonly used to refer to qualitative 
research and policy work, influenced by academic social anthropology. It is normally 
commissioned by policy-related institutions on a consultancy basis, and is particularly 
common in the health sector and ‘grassroots’ international development 
programmes.</NOTE> 
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